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to set its investigative 2 5 and disciplinary 2 6 processes in motion.
With respect to forwarding fees, a more aggressive procedure
would seem appropriate in order to preserve the high pro-
fessional standards intended to be fostered by the Canons of
Professional Ethics. 2 7
R. R. C.
25 Va. Code of 1950 § 54-48.
26 Rules for Integration of the Bar, as amended, IV § 5, 194 Va. clxix (1953).
27 See preamble to the Canons for a definitive statement of the intent and scope
of the Canons.
EVIDENCE-INTRODUCTION OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE BASED ON AN INFERENCE ON AN IN-
FERENCE ALLOWED
In a recent California case the appellate court affirmed a
conviction of kidnapping, asserting:
We can not say as a matter of law that there was no
evidence to support the inference of asportation by the
defendant in this case. 1
The defense was based on the principle that an inference
cannot be based upon an inference.
The only evidence tending to prove the guilt of the accused
was that he was discovered with the child shortly after her dis-
appearance. To support the inference of kindnapping evidence
was introduced that; (1) the defendant had been in the victim's
home on a previous occasion and (2) the child was asleep in her
second story bedroom forty-five minutes before the alleged
crime took place.
The court ruled that the principle of the inadmissibility of an
inference based on an inference has been discarded by many
courts and asserted that:
I People v. Phillips, 343 P2d 270, 273 (1959).
6RECENT CASES
The true rule is and should be that an inference cannot
be based on an inference which is too remote or con-
jectural.2
Weakening the inference is the fact that the child had once
previously walked in her sleep and her father, "inferring" that
she had done so again, began to search for her and subsequently
discovered the defendant with the child in the backyard.
If the rule as set forth by this court is correct then it is
within the province of the jury to choose the inference which
indicates that the accused is guilty.
Wigmore endorses this rule:
It was once suggested that an inference on an inference
will not be permitted ... There is no such rule. 3
This so called "true rule" depends upon the validity of each
inference. As was stated in Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti:
An inference cannot be based on an inference that is too
remote or conjectural, but in a civil case where the first
inference is a reasonably probable one, it may be used
as a basis for a succeeding inference. 4 (Emphasis added)
The danger involved in such a rule is the possibility that the
inferences may be mere suppositions vitiating the entire hypo-
thesis.
"Inference" in legal parlance as respects evidence is a
very different thing from "supposition".. . Courts and
juries in dealing with the inquiry whether a party has dis-
charged his burden of proof, can not pronounce on mere
supposition that the burden has been met, but can only
establish the ultimate fact from others justifying such
inference. 5
2 Peoplev. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166,238 P2d 1001,1014 (1951).
3 Wigmore, Evidence I (3rd 1940) p41.
4 71 Cal. A. 687, 163 P2d 470 (1945) To the extent it may have been relied upon
in the principle case, it is possibly an invalid reference inasmuch as it is re-
stricted to civil cases.
5 Words and Phrases, vol. 4, p. 3579; vol. 8, p 6807, as cited in Miller-Brent
Lumber Co. v. Douglas, 167 Ala. 286,52 So. 414 (1910).
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Of course, an inference from an inference, and then a
third and fourth, may under certain circumstances be ad-
missible ... but the more remote the inference the more
enfeebled its probative force. 6
Some courts have adopted this reasoning to determine
whether the introduction of evidence by this method satisfies
the burden of proof. In a Missouri case it was stated:
The case was one of circumstantial evidence and the
state's case depended upon the jury's finding and be-
lieving that the facts and circumstances in the evidence
pointed so strongly to the defendant's guilt as to exclude
any other reasonable hypothesis. Only by reasoning from
other facts was it at all possible to infer the fact that the
hogs the defendant sold... were the hogs stolen.
Similarly a Virginia case holds:
Generally speaking, in cases where the conviction of the
accused must rest upon circumstantial evidence much
weight is given to contradictory statements of material
facts by the accused, but such statements are not con-
dusive of his guilt. They should be considered along
with the other facts and circumstances shown in evi-
dence to determine whether, upon the whole case, the
evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis consis-
tent with his innocence. It is not sufficient that the facts
and circumstances be consistent with his guilt. They must be
inconsistent with his innocence. 8 (Emphasis added)
Appreciation of this principal is lacking in the Phillips case.
Two inferences were apparent. The deadly one, of asportation,
was adopted; while the saving one, that the child was sleep-
6 Sturm v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 212 Ill. App. 354 (1918).
7 State v. Lackland, 136 Mo. 26, 37 S.W. 812, 814 (1896) this court supports the
view that an inference which supports another inference should be established
by direct evidence.
8 Massie v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 557, 125 S.E. 146 (1924) this court reversed a
conviction of assisting an escape. The accused often visited the jail to see
a friend. On the day of the escape the accused was seen handing foodstuffs to
the prisoners who subsequently escaped. He had also purchased hacksaw
blades similar to the ones found in the jail. He contended that he had found a
note asking him to deliver the blades under a bridge and that he had done so.
RECENT CASES
walking, was discarded. This, in spite of the fact that a hypo-
thesis which lent credence to his innocence was also reasonable.
The court in its decision describes the saving inference as an
"element of opposite import." 9 It was also conceded that the
basis for the inference of guilt is "exceedingly slender and
tenuous." 10
The Virginia courts are indisposed to allow proof of a fact
by an inference upon an inference:
It is important that crime be punished. It is even more
important that the one punished should first be proved
guilty by the evidence. In order for inferences to amount
to evidence they must be inferences based on facts that
are proved and not inferences based on other infer-
ences. 11
The California rule that: "an inference cannot be based on
an inferences that is too remote or conjectural," presents a
problem when more than one reasonable inference springs
from the same facts. Criminal courts should be ever vigilant
to protect the accused from an extention of this rule.
From the facts presented in the Phillips case it would appear
that the jury arbitrarily adopted the inference which convicted
the accused. It appears that the assault, from which the appel-
late court implied Phillips' guilt, was a strong factor influenc-
ing the jury. In doing so the jury built an inference on an
inference-a construction most delicately balanced. Is it not
the court's duty to prevent the inherent weakness of such
tenuous evidence from working an undue hardship on the
accused? Fortunately some courts have:
... it becomes the duty of the court to consider whether
or not the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict.
But the rule (it is heard as upon a demurrer to the evi-
dence) does not leave the jury at liberty to guess, and
9 People v. Phillips, 343 P2d 270, 272, (1959).
10 Ibid.
11 Smith v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 800, 40 S.E. 2d 273 (1946).
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where a fact is equally susceptible of two interpretations
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused, they can not arbitrarily adopt that interpretation
which incriminates him. 12
Where the prosecution's case lies somewhere in a muddle
of hypotheses, justice can hardly be served when absolute guilt
is extracted where they are strong importations of innocence.
Such a verdict can not be called, "beyond a reasonable doubt."
S. G.
12 Burton and Conquest v. Commonwealth, 108 Va. 892, 899, 62 S.E. 2d 376
(1908).
SALES, IMPLIED WARRANTY-MANUFACTURER'S
LIABILITY TO ULTIMATE CONSUMERS ON THEORY
OF PUBLIC POLICY
The manufacturer of food for human consumption, who
packages such food in sealed containers, will be liable to the
ultimate consumer where the consumer has suffered damages as
a consequence of impurities therein on the theory of implied
warranty, irrespective of a lack of privity of contract between
the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer. 1 The Supreme
Court of Virginia supports this theory on the basis of public
policy, where a smoked pork shoulder wrapped in cellophane
and labeled by the processor was purchased from a supermarket
and the purchaser's wife became ill from eating the pork due to
impurities in it prior to the time it left the processor's plant. 2
Heretofore, Virginia has followed the common law doctrine
that one who sells foodstuffs for human consumption impliedly
warrants its' fitness and wholesomeness for such purpose and is
liable not only for the result of any neglient act involved in fail-
ing to use reasonable care in the preparation and handling of
his product, but is liable on implied warranty where there is
1 Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d. 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479,
(1940).
2 Swift v. Wells, 201 Va.-, 110 S.E. 2d. 203 (1959).
